Re-interpreting sub-group inequality decompositions by Elbers, Chris et al.
 
 
Re-Interpreting Sub-Group Inequality Decompositions 
 






We propose a modification to the conventional approach of decomposing income 
inequality by population sub-groups.  Specifically, we propose a measure that evaluates 
observed between-group inequality against a benchmark of maximum between-group 
inequality that can be attained when the number and relative sizes of groups under 
examination are fixed.  We argue that such a modification can provide a complementary 
perspective on the question of whether a particular population breakdown is salient to an 
assessment of inequality in a country.  As our measure normalizes between-group 
inequality by the number and relative sizes of groups, it is also less subject to problems of 
comparability across different settings.  We show that for a large set of countries our 
assessment of the importance of group differences typically increases substantially on the 
basis of this approach.  The ranking of countries (or different population groups) can also 
differ from that obtained using traditional decomposition methods.  Finally, we observe 
an interesting pattern of higher levels of overall inequality in countries where our 
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The significance of group differences in wellbeing is often at the center of the 
study of inequality.  Roemer (1998) suggests that inequality of opportunity occurs when 
the ability of people to pursue lives of their own choosing depends on predetermined 
characteristics, such as gender, race, social group, or family background.
2  T h i s  
perspective implies that it can be instructive to disentangle inequalities due to differences 
between groups, defined in terms of such predetermined characteristics, from those due 
to, say, individual differences in effort, talent, or luck.  Given two countries with the 
same overall income inequality, one might worry more about social stability and 
prospects for inclusive long-term prosperity in the country with higher inequality 
between groups. 
Statistical methods are often used to ‘decompose’ economic inequality into 
constituent parts.  Sub-group decomposable measures of inequality can be written as the 
sum of inequality that is attributable to differences in mean outcomes across population 
sub-groups and that which is due to inequality within those sub-groups.
3  Many have used 
such decompositions to ‘understand’ economic inequality and guide the design of 
economic policy.  Indeed, Cowell (2000) argues: “It is almost essential to attempt to 
‘account for’ the level of, or trend in, inequality by components of the population.” 
Although decompositions of inequality, as described above, have long been the 
workhorse in this literature, empirical implementation has tended to find little evidence of 
significant between group differences.  For example, in a classic reference, Anand (1983) 
                                                 
2 World Development Report 2006, entitled “Equity and Development,” adopts a notion of equity that combines the concept of 
equality of opportunities with the avoidance of absolute deprivation – a Rawlsian form of inequality aversion in the space of 
outcomes. 
3 See Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980, 1984) and Cowell (1980). Cowell (2000) provides a recent survey of methods of 
inequality measurement, including a discussion of the various approaches to sub-group decomposition.  
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showed that inequality between ethnic groups in Malaysia accounted for only 15% of 
total inequality in the 1970s.  This led to his recommendation that government strategy 
should focus on inequality within ethnic groups rather than that between them.  Cowell 
and Jenkins (1995), who find that most income inequality remains unexplained even after 
taking into account the age, sex, race and earner status of the household head in the U.S., 
argue that the real story of inequality is to be found within these population groups and 
point to the importance of chance. 
Not everyone is comfortable with such interpretations, however.  Kanbur (2000) 
states that the use of such decompositions “…assists the easy slide into a neglect of inter-
group inequality in the current literature.”  He argues that finding a relatively small share 
of inequality between groups does not mean that the mean differences between them are 
less important than inequalities within such groupings.  In particular, he argues that social 
stability and racial harmony can break down once the average differences between groups 
go beyond a certain threshold, with the threshold varying from country to country.
4 
There are also difficulties with comparisons of such decompositions across 
settings (e.g among countries or over time).  This is because underlying population 
structures often vary.  Consider three countries where the issue of racial differences in 
income features prominently in public discourse: the United States, Brazil and South 
Africa.  The shares of income inequality attributable to differences between racial groups 
                                                 
4 Foster and Sen (1997) point to the ‘separatist’ view implicit in these sub-group consistent measures, which they claim 
ignores potentially relevant information when making inequality comparisons.  For example, should a change in inequality 
within a certain group (while the means and population shares remain unchanged) when that group is richer than a second  
group affect inequality in exactly the same manner as in the presence of a much wealthier second group?  Sub-group 
consistency requires this to be true.  Kanbur (2000) builds on this argument and suggests that invoking such separatist axioms 
“…go[es] against basic intuition and considerable evidence which suggest that individuals do indeed pay special attention to 
outcomes for their particular racial, ethnic, or regional group.”  
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in these countries are 8%, 16%, and 38%, respectively.
5  Do these numbers provide a 
good yardstick with which to judge the relevance of race to an understanding of 
inequality in these countries?  Should South African and Brazilian policy-makers worry 
much more about racial differences in incomes than do their American counterparts?  
Does the small percentage of income inequality attributable to race in the U.S. mean that 
racial inequality is not a pertinent economic and social issue?   
Conventionally, between-group inequality is calculated as a function of two 
arguments: differences among groups in mean incomes and the relative size and number 
of the groups.  The figures above are based on four population groups for Brazil, three for 
South Africa, and five for the U.S., but the population shares of the white groups versus 
non-white groups differ tremendously.
6  In each country, the mean income of the non-
white groups is much below that of the white group, but the non-white groups form the 
majority in South Africa (80%), half of the population in Brazil (50%), and a minority in 
the U.S. (28%).  The difference in between-group inequality observed between these 
three countries could in fact be due largely to the difference in population shares of the 
racial groups instead of the differences in relative mean incomes of these groups.
7  
The conventional between-group share is calculated by taking the ratio of 
observed between-group inequality to total inequality.  Total inequality, however, can be 
viewed as the between-group inequality that would be observed if every household in the 
                                                 
5 These figures have been calculated by the authors using data from PNAD (2001) for Brazil, IES(2000) for South Africa, and 
LIS(2000) for the U.S. 
6 The racial groups used in our analysis are “White”, “Black”, “Pardo”, and “other” in Brazil, “White”, “African”, and “other” 
(combining Coloreds, Asians/Indians, and others) in South Africa, and “White”, “Black”, “Hispanic”, “Asian”, and “American 
Indian” in the U.S. 
7 The observed differences in between-group inequality may also depend on the number of groups under consideration, 
making the specific definition of groups a non-negligible issue.  For example, the share of between-group inequality 
attributable to caste in India when one groups people simply into “high”, ‘medium”, or “low” caste groupings, can be quite 
different from that which emerges when the partitions are finer, i.e. when one makes distinctions between castes within each 
broad category.  
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population constituted a separate group.  Thus, the conventional practice is equivalent to 
comparing observed between-group inequality (across a few groups) against a benchmark 
(across perhaps millions of groups) that is quite extreme. It is not surprising that one 
rarely observes a high share of between-group inequality.
8  In this paper, we propose an 
alternative measure to assess between-group inequality.  Specifically, we suggest 
replacing total inequality in the denominator of the conventional ratio with the maximum 
between-group inequality that could be obtained if the number of groups and their sizes 
were restricted to be the same as for the numerator.  Because our proposed measure 
normalizes by the number of groups and their relative sizes in a country, decompositions 
can be better compared across settings where the number of groups (or the population 
shares for those groups) is very different.   
We also argue that our measure is better suited to capture the salience of a 
specific population breakdown to the assessment of inequality of opportunities.  As 
indicated earlier, inequality of opportunity is concerned with systematic differences 
among groups who differ only in skin color, caste, gender, etc. – predetermined 
characteristics that are arguably “morally irrelevant”.  Consider the following example 
(illustrated in figure 1).  Imagine a country with two population groups of equal size: 
serfs and landlords.  Mean income of the serfs is low while landlords enjoy a high mean 
income.  In period 1, there is no variation in the incomes of individuals who belong to the 
same group, i.e. one’s social group determines his or her income perfectly.  In period 2, 
some random noise, εi, is added to each income.  One can think of εi as pure luck or, 
alternatively, measurement error.  Hence, in the second period, there is income inequality 
within each group, although the respective means are still the same as in period 1.   
                                                 
8 See Anand (1983), Cowell and Jenkins (1995), Elbers et al. (2004).  
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Suppose that the resulting two distributions do not overlap.  Has inequality of opportunity 
changed from period 1 to period 2?
9 
It is not clear why the presence of some random variation around these group 
means should be indicative of any change in underlying opportunities.  After all, even the 
luckiest serf is still far poorer than the poorest landlord.  However, if the question above 
were to be assessed on the basis of the between-group share that derives from traditional 
inequality decomposition, one would conclude that inequality of opportunity had fallen 
from period 1 to period 2.  This is because within-group inequality in period 2 increased 
while between-group inequality remained unchanged (as mean incomes and population 
shares for the two groups were unchanged), implying that the share of between-group 
inequality fell between periods 1 and 2.  As will be elaborated further in section 2, our 
proposed measure would remain unchanged – suggesting that inequality of opportunity 
did not fall between periods 1 and 2.
10 
 
                                                 
9 Some readers will note that this example is somewhat similar to Example 1 in Esteban and Ray (2004), where their Figure 1b 
is analogous to period 1 in our example, while Figure 1a is akin to period 2.  However, there is one important difference: the 
groups in Esteban and Ray are defined by incomes.  Whether blacks and whites, or serfs and landlords fill the income 
distribution is of no consequence in their example.  We are interested in income differences between groups defined by 
another characteristic, such as race, class, gender, parent’s education, etc.  In general, in an example such as this, the Esteban 
and Ray polarization index would register a decline in polarization as we move from period 1 to period 2.  However, it is 
interesting to note that in the specific case of the two groups having identical sizes, the Esteban and Ray polarization index 
would in fact register an increase in polarization.  For our purposes, the point to emphasize is that the polarization index, like 
between-group inequality, would not remain unchanged in moving from period 1 to period 2. 
10 Our alternative measure would also start declining in period 2 if the two income distributions started to overlap, but at a rate 
much slower than the traditional between-group inequality share (see section 2).  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the 
theoretical inequality decomposition literature and introduces our alternative approach.  
Section 3 draws on a newly compiled database of inequality and sub-group contributions 
for just under 100 developed and developing countries to demonstrate that qualitative 
assessments of the importance of between-group differences can, but need not, be 
markedly higher when based on our alternative approach.  This section also discusses a 
thought-provoking finding of a strong positive correlation across countries between 




2.  Methodology 
The standard approach to decomposing inequality by population sub-groups 
breaks overall inequality into a between-group and a within-group component.  The first 
component indicates how much of overall inequality would remain if incomes were 
equalized within each population group, i.e. each member of a particular group being 
given the group’s average per capita income.  The within-group component captures the 
amount of inequality that would remain if differences between groups in terms of their 
average incomes were eliminated and only within-group differences remained. 
Not all summary measures of inequality can be neatly decomposed into these two 
components.  The most commonly decomposed measures in the literature come from the 
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where fi is the population share of household i,  yi is per capita consumption of household i, 
μ is average per capita consumption, and c is a parameter that is to be selected by the user.
11  
This class of inequality measures can be decomposed into a between and within-group 
component as follows: 
                                                 
11 Lower values of c are associated with greater sensitivity to inequality amongst the poor, and higher values of c place more 
weight to inequality among the rich. A c value of 1 yields the well known Theil entropy measure, a value of 0 provides the 
Theil L or mean log deviation, and a value of 2 is ordinally equivalent to the squared coefficient of variation.  
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where j refers to the sub-group, gj refers to the population share of group j and GEj refers to 
inequality in group j. The between-group component of inequality is captured by the first 
term: the level of inequality if everyone within each group j had consumption level μj.  The 
second term gives within-group inequality. 
Table 1 decomposes inequality on the basis of “social group” in eight countries.  
Social group is defined differently across countries, but refers loosely to the racial, ethnic, 
or caste breakdown that is relevant to each country.  For example, the breakdown for the 
United States corresponds to five racial groups: Whites, Blacks, American Indians, 
Asians and Hispanics.  In India the three groups comprise Scheduled Caste households, 
Scheduled Tribes, and Others.  The number of groups and their respective sizes are 
clearly not the same in all countries.  Inequality is estimated on the basis of per-capita 
consumption for each country and we have chosen to measure it using a General Entropy 
Class measure with parameter value zero.  This is often referred to as the Theil L measure 
or the mean log deviation, and compared with other General Entropy Class measures 
places a good deal more weight on inequalities amongst the poor. 
Based on the standard approach to decomposing inequality, as described above, 
between group inequality in each country in our list is rather low (Table 1, column III).   
  11
Only South Africa stands out with a between-race share of 38%.  Even here, however, it 
is striking to note that nearly two-thirds of total inequality in South Africa can be 
attributed to differences within racial groups as opposed to differences across groups. 
The generally low between-group shares we observe in Table 1 are typical in the 
literature, even for other population breakdowns commonly encountered.
12  B u t  h o w  
should this finding of a low between-group share be interpreted?  Does it mean that the 
population breakdown along social dimensions is not terribly relevant to thinking about 
inequality in these countries? 
In what follows, we propose an alternative perspective on the between-group 
share of inequality.  While South Africa’s between race inequality share is “only” 38%, 
we show that observed between race inequality accounts for more than 50% of the 
‘maximum possible’ between-race inequality in South Africa given its current income 
distribution, the number of racial groups, their sizes, and their ranking in terms of average 
income (see Table 1, column IV).  A similar point can be made when comparing Brazil 
and Panama.  Based on the standard decomposition by race/ethnic group, the between-
group share of inequality in both countries is only about 16%.  This calculation would 
conventionally be interpreted as suggesting that race or ethnicity is of limited relevance 
to an understanding of inequality in these two countries. However, in Panama, observed 
between-race inequality accounts for well over a third of ‘maximum possible’ between-
race inequality, while in Brazil the conclusion based on our measure is only slightly 
different from that which obtained from the standard calculation (see Table 1). 
 
                                                 
12 For example, Elbers et al. (2004) demonstrate that the share of inequality attributable to differences between the 1248 
communities into which Madagascar can be subdivided is approximately 25%.  
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2.1  Maximum Between-Group Inequality  
In studies of inequality one often encounters statements of the following type: 
“between-group income inequality accounts for only 20% of total inequality”. Such 
statements, however, should not be taken to mean that 100% of total inequality would 
have been a realistic possibility.  A between-group share of 100% would be possible only 
under two, rather unlikely, scenarios.  First, if each household constitutes a separate 
“group” then total inequality is clearly also equal to between-group inequality.  Second, a 
between group share of 100% would occur if there were fewer groups than households, 
but somehow all the households within each of these groups genuinely happened to have 
identical per capita incomes.  Rather than having a bell-shape, the density function of 
income in this latter case would consist of a series of spikes occurring at the average per 
capita income level for different groups (as in the first period in figure 1 above).  It is 
difficult to imagine a realistic setting in which this would occur: for virtually any 
empirically relevant income distribution and a limited number of groups, the share of 
maximum between-group inequality that can be attained is strictly below 1. 
Hence, not all possible groupings of the population are equally relevant in 
assessing the salience of inequality between certain groups.  But, what groupings are 
most relevant?  In this section, we propose a measure that evaluates observed between-
group inequality (BGI) against a benchmark of maximum between-group inequality that 
can be attained when the number and relative sizes of groups under examination are 
fixed:
13 
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A different approach could be based on statistical testing.  One could ask how (un)likely it is that a particular value of 
between-group inequality is the result of pure chance given the number of groups and their relative sizes, i.e., test the null 
hypothesis that it is the result of a random allocation of incomes over households in society (keeping the overall income 
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Since BGI can never exceed total inequality, it follows that Rb' cannot be smaller 
than Rb.
14  It is also clear from the formula above that if maximum BGI attainable is 
close to total inequality, then Rb and Rb' will also be close to each other.  Put differently, 
if there is a way of reordering the population into a given number of groups with fixed 
sizes such that the inequality between the resulting groups is almost equal to total 
inequality, then Rb' will not differ significantly from Rb.  This is true, for example, in the 
case of inequality between social groups in Brazil, where our alternative measure is only 
slightly higher at 20% than the conventional between-group share of 16%, but not in 
Panama, where the analogous figures are 36% and 17%, respectively (see Table 1). 
To see how the maximum attainable BGI can differ from context to context, take 
the rectangular and triangular distributions depicted in figure 2 below.  In both cases, 
assume that there are two groups, each containing half the population.  A necessary 
condition for BGI to be at its maximum is that these two groups occupy non-overlapping 
partitions of the distribution of income: if {y} is an income distribution for which BGI is 
maximized, and g and h are different groups then either all incomes in g are higher than 
all incomes in h, or vice versa. (See Shorrocks and Wan, 2004, section 3.).  Hence, for 
each of the distributions in figure 2, the maximum BGI is attained when one group 
                                                                                                                                                 
between-group inequalities are almost always above zero in a statistically significant manner.  While we could use these 
significance levels to rank levels of between-group inequality, it is not so clear how to interpret a difference between 
significance levels of, say, 0.999 and 0.9995. 
14 We follow the notation in Cowell and Jenkins (1995).  
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occupies the bottom half of the income distribution, and the other the top.
15  In this 
particular example, it can be readily verified that maximum BGI as measured by GE(0) is 
0.14 in the uniform case and 0.06 for the triangular distribution.  In this hypothetical 
society, an observed between-group inequality of, say, 0.05 is arguably much more 
extreme (or salient) in the case of the triangular income distribution than the uniform one. 




In order to calculate Rb' we need to know BGI, which can be calculated in the 
usual way, and maximum BGI, which is slightly more difficult to compute.  A “brute-
force” approach to calculating maximum BGI uses the property (mentioned above) that 
under a BGI-maximizing distribution, group incomes occupy non-overlapping intervals.  
In the case of n  groups, the following approach can be followed: take a particular 
permutation of groups {g(1),…, g(n)}, allocate the lowest incomes to group g(1), then to 
g(2), etc., and calculate the corresponding BGI.  Repeat this for all possible n! 
permutations.  The highest resulting BGI is the maximum sought.  This approach is 
obviously easier when the number of groups under examination is small.  In the 
                                                 
15 Because the sizes of the groups are identical, it does not matter which group occupies which part of the distribution.  
  15
appendix, we describe some alternative approaches to solving the problem of maximizing 
between-group inequality for the Gini coefficient.
16  The same appendix also shows that 
without restrictions on the income distribution, no group order can be a priori excluded as 
a candidate for the BGI maximizing one. 
In general, maximum BGI need not increase if the number of groups grows.
17  
However, BGI cannot decline if more groups are obtained via proper sub-divisions of the 
existing groups.
18  In the limit, when every individual constitutes her own group, 
maximum BGI equals total inequality, and consequently Rb=Rb'. 
A possibly more appealing benchmark against which to evaluate between-group 
inequality can be obtained by introducing one more restriction.  In addition to fixing the 
number of groups and their relative sizes, we can also arrange the groups under 
examination according to their observed mean incomes, keeping their ‘pecking order’ 
unchanged.
19  In many cases, there is a well-understood hierarchy of population groups in 
terms of their mean incomes.  Comparing actual between-group inequality to a 
counterfactual maximum BGI which preserves the actual, observed, rank ordering of 
groups is conceivably of greater interest than a counterfactual which allows for random 
                                                 
16 The choice of Gini is for computational convenience and is not uncommon in the literature that precedes us, such as Davies 
and Shorrocks (1989). 
17 In the case of the Gini coefficient, the difference between total inequality and maximum BGI can be crudely bounded and 
the bounds are functions of the population share of the largest group, and not by the number of groups (see the appendix for a 
proof).  Maximum BGI will stay bounded away from total inequality unless the maximum group size becomes sufficiently 
small.  This implies that although the expected value of between group inequality might increase as the number of groups 
increases (Shorrocks and Wan (2004), proposition 3), this value may be well below total inequality if one of the groups 
remains very large.  For example, with a lognormal (0,1) distribution and one group occupying 70% of the population while 
every other individual constitutes a separate group (implying effectively an infinite number of groups), the maximum possible 
between group inequality (measured by GE(0)) would be 0.373 – well below the inequality level of 0.5 in this distribution.  
For related results, see Davies and Shorrocks (1989) and Shorrocks and Wan (2004). 
18 Starting from a BGI-maximizing group order, split-up a group in such a way that mean incomes in the new groups are equal 
to the old parent group.  BGI among these groups is equal to the old BGI.  Obviously, if the incomes of the two new groups 
are non-overlapping, then BGI will increase.  Hence a refinement of a particular grouping will generally lead to an increase in 
BGI.  See also Shorrocks and Wan (2004), proposition 2. 
19 Ordering population groups by their mean incomes using, say, a household survey would introduce a possible difficulty due 
to sampling variability.  In other words, our ability to order groups by mean income (or consumption) could be limited by the 
fact that some of the group means are statistically indistinguishable from each other.  For the time being, we ignore the 
standard errors associated with the observed group means.  
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re-ordering of groups.  For example, when decomposing inequality by race in Brazil, 
South Africa, or the U.S. (see the example in Section 1), the ordering of racial groups in 
terms of mean incomes is well-documented, and it is not obvious to what extent a 
counterfactual of say, average income of blacks exceeding that of whites would be 
realistic and of any inherent interest.  This approach is also appealing for practical 
reasons as it involves just one, rather than n! calculations of BGI. 
Obtaining the maximum possible BGI given the current income distribution, 
relative group sizes, and their rankings by mean incomes is trivial: allocate the lowest 
incomes to members of the group with lowest mean income, the lowest remaining 
incomes to the group with the 2
nd lowest mean income, etc.  In the rest of this paper, Rb' 
will refer to our index of BGI normalized by the maximum possible BGI given the 
current income distribution, relative group sizes, and their “pecking order.” 
 
Salience of grouping for income inequality 
In the preceding sections we have introduced Rb' in an effort to assess whether 
group sub-divisions that should not be relevant in a moral sense, in fact display 
significant between group inequality.  We can compare one way of sub-dividing the 
population to another.  We could have asked an alternative question: how well does a 
person’s income predict his or her group membership in one kind of population grouping 
relative to another?  It is clear that in the case where an income distribution is divided 
into non-overlapping groups, a person’s group can be perfectly predicted once her 
income is known.   In general, if income is a good predictor of group membership then it 
would seem reasonable to regard that particular grouping as “salient” to the analysis of  
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inequality, especially inequality of opportunity.  Thus we are led to ask if Rb' indicates 
salience in the above sense. We are able to show that, compared to Rb, it is indeed more 
sensitive to overlap in the support of the groups’ income distributions and is less sensitive 
to inequality within those groups.
20  An illustration may clarify. 
Consider again a population consisting of two groups.  Each group’s (weighted) 
density of the income distribution is graphed in figure 3.  Suppose we introduce a series 
of progressive transfers amongst the population represented by density f1.  Specifically, 
we transfer incomes from those individuals with income below b but above a, to those 
individuals with income below a.  We continue with these transfers until all individuals 
with incomes below b have the same income a.  Clearly, redistributing incomes in this 
specific way has not affected our ability predict membership of either of the two groups 
based on knowledge only of observed incomes.  Because group means, BGI, and 
maximum BGI are unaffected, Rb' is also unchanged.  However, within-group inequality 
and total inequality decrease (because of the progressive transfers within group 1) and so 
Rb will go up.  This change in Rb reflects a drop in total inequality that is not correlated 
with one’s success in the ‘salience game’ described above.
21   
 
                                                 
20 Whether Rb' can be interpreted as an average success rate of guessing a person’s group membership on the basis of income 
information alone, is a question we leave for future research. 
21 Pyatt (1976) also invokes the concept of a “game” when exploring the feasibility of sub-group decomposition of the Gini 








The perspective on ‘salience’ of group definitions offered by Rb´ may be of 
interest also in settings other than the analysis of inequality of opportunity.  While the 
latter exercise starts from the position that certain predetermined group definitions are 
judged to be “morally irrelevant” (Roemer, 1998) and then seeks to ascertain to what 
extent these groups are relevant to an understanding of inequality, there may also be 
situations where group definition does not precede the analysis, but is determined ex-
post.  For example, a politician may be interested in tailoring his economic policies and 
messages to specific groups in the population and would like to know which group 
definitions are most ‘salient’ in the sense we are considering here.
22  In this case, he (or 
she) might consider performing a search across different group definitions until the most 
‘salient’ definition is identified.  Basing this “search” on Rb´ would appear to be 
                                                 
22 Kanbur (2005) gives a similar example while discussing the policy implications of using conventional inequality 
decompositions.  
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particularly appealing as it is more readily comparable across different group definitions 
as a result of the normalization by maximum BGI.
23 
 
3.  Evidence 
Expressing observed between-group inequality as a fraction of the maximum 
possible BGI can provide additional insight in the analysis of inequality.  Figures 4-6 
decompose inequality on the basis of three different sub-group definitions for a number 
of developed and developing countries.  Our data come from nationally representative 
household surveys from each of the countries and all refer to a year during the 1990s.  
We consider three ways of breaking down the population in each country: by social group 
membership, rural-urban location of residence, and education of household head (not all 
countries’ data permit a breakdown along all three dimensions, however).  Of these 
groups, only social group membership (which loosely refers to racial, ethnic, or caste 
breakdown relevant to each country) can be truly considered as a ‘circumstance’ or a pre-
determined characteristic, and as such consistent with measuring inequality of 
opportunity.  In the rest of our empirical work, we would have ideally used place of birth 
instead of rural-urban residence, and parents’ education in place of education of 
household head.  However, many of the household surveys in our database do not permit 
us to break the population down by these circumstance variables, and hence the variables 
we use instead can be viewed at best as crude proxies for an individual’s circumstances.
24  
For each country and for each sub-group definition, the between-group share is calculated 
                                                 
23 We are grateful to Sam Bowles for suggesting to us this interpretation of Rb´. 
24 Such data on individual circumstances, of course, exists for an increasing number of countries.  For example, drawing on the 
distinction between ‘circumstance’ and ‘effort’ variables in Roemer’s work on equality of opportunity, Bourguignon, Ferreira, 
and Menéndez (2003) uses a different method to decompose earnings inequality in Brazil into a component due to unequal 
opportunities and a residual term.  
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in both the conventional manner, with total inequality as denominator, as well as on the 
basis of the Rb' calculation outlined above. 
The data are not strictly comparable as inequality is typically measured differently 
across countries – based sometimes on a consumption measure of welfare and sometimes 
on an income measure.  Even where the welfare indicators are based on the same 
concept, the precise definition is almost never the same across countries.  We have 
explored the sensitivity of decomposition analyses to alternative welfare indicators for a 
sub-set of 14 countries in which we have both income and consumption data.  We have 
found that while overall measured inequality typically varies markedly across welfare 
indicators (with measured inequality based on an per-capita income measure usually 
being higher than inequality based on a per-capita consumption measure), decomposition 
results tend to vary only slightly.  This finding that inequality “profiles” are less sensitive 
to different underlying welfare definitions than direct inequality comparisons echoes a 
similar finding in the poverty literature that poverty profiles are often quite robust to 
varying underlying welfare definitions and poverty lines (see Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 
2001).  Thus, while the data examined here are far from comparable in terms of overall 
measured inequality we contend that comparisons of decomposition results are much less 
problematic. 
Moreover, as we have emphasized above, one of the attractions of the Rb' 
measure is that it normalizes by the observed number and relative size of observed 
groups, within each distribution of income that is being considered.  We have already 
described above how, for example, decomposition by social group involves quite  
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different group definitions and sizes in different countries.  Working with Rb' rather than 
Rb is thus less subject to comparability concerns from this perspective as well. 
Figure 4 decomposes inequality on the basis of a rural/urban breakdown in 85 
countries.  Countries are grouped by region and ranked within each region by 
conventionally calculated Rb.  In each country both Rb and Rb' are reported.  Several 
observations can be offered.  First, in most countries the conventionally calculated 
between-group share is generally well below the Rb’ calculation.   Indeed, in Senegal, 
Guinea, Burundi, Kenya, Guatemala, Panama and Bolivia, the between-group 
contribution based on Rb' rises above 40%, suggesting that in these countries inequality is 
strongly colored by these spatial issues.  In only two out of 85 countries is conventionally 
calculated Rb as high as 30%, but the number increases eight-fold to 16 out of 85 on the 
basis of Rb'.  The between-sector inequality contribution is generally lowest for the most 
developed countries in our sample, as well as for a number of the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asian countries, irrespective of the manner in which this contribution is 
calculated (see further below). 
Figure 5 returns to the breakdown of inequality by social groupings described in 
Table 1, now for a total of 35 countries.  Again, the definition of social group (and 
number of groups) differs across countries, but is generally based on some criterion 
related to ethnicity, races, or religion.  The evidence in Figure 5 suggests that social 
grouping is a particularly important dimension of the inequality profile in South Africa, 
Paraguay, Guatemala and Panama.  In these countries, Rb' is above 30%, and indeed in 
South Africa it reaches to nearly 60%.  
  22
While Rb' is always higher than conventionally measured Rb, the degree to which 
these two statistics differ varies considerably across countries.  In Nepal and Madagascar, 
for example, one’s assessment of the salience of social groups does not much vary across 
the two approaches, while in South Africa, Paraguay, Vietnam, France, Panama, and 
Peru, they yield very different conclusions.  It is interesting to note the rank reversals 
between U.S., Germany, and France when our alternative approach is employed. 
Figure 6 decomposes inequality on the basis of roughly five education groups in 
each of 91 countries.
25  Education level of household head is a particularly salient 
dimension of inequality in many Latin American countries, as well as in several African 
countries and Thailand.  In general, although Rb'  is naturally higher than Rb, the 
difference between the two statistics is not as large for decompositions by education as in 
the previous two population breakdowns.  Indeed, the ranking of countries on the basis of 
Rb' is not much different from that on the basis of Rb. 
Overall, we can see from these illustrative calculations that employment of the 
Rb’ calculation has the general effect of significantly raising one’s assessment of the 
importance of group differences in an examination of inequality.  To the extent that this 
approach is viewed to contribute a meaningful perspective on the importance of group 
differences, the qualitative conclusions that have tended to be drawn in the conventional 
literature may merit reconsideration. 
 
Correlating Total Inequality and Between-Group Inequality 
                                                 
25 The five broad education categories correspond to levels achieved by the household head, and refer to: no education, up to 
primary only, above primary but below secondary completion, secondary completion, post-secondary education.  This 
definition of education groupings could not be applied in an exactly identical manner in all countries and is therefore only 
broadly comparable across countries.  
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As mentioned in Section 1, Kanbur (2000) has cautioned against concluding that 
simply because (conventionally calculated) between-group contributions to inequality are 
generally low, this should be taken to imply that between group differences are of only 
limited importance to an overall assessment of inequality.  In the spirit of probing further 
this concern we ask here whether, across our set of countries, there is any statistical 
relationship between overall inequality and the percentage contribution that is attributable 
to between-group differences.  We regress overall inequality in each country separately 
on the between-group contribution (based on Rb') attributable to four population 
breakdowns: rural-urban location of residence, social group, occupation of household 
head, and education of household head.  As we have noted, our data are far from 
comparable in terms of overall measured inequality due to different definitions of welfare 
being employed in different countries.  To accommodate this concern, albeit only 
partially, we include in our regression a set of regional dummy variables as well as a 
dummy indicating whether a particular country’s inequality is measured on the basis of 
per-capita consumption or income.  Regression results have also been screened for the 
influence of outliers and influential observations.
26 
Figure 7 presents our results.  There is strong evidence of a positive correlation 
between overall inequality and the between-group contribution, irrespective of the 
specific group definition.  It is important to realize that there is nothing inherent in the 
mechanics of the decomposition calculation that ensures that there should be a positive 
relationship between the overall level of inequality and the percentage contribution that 
                                                 
26 We do not report regressions results based on a model of overall inequality on Rb.  Our qualitative findings are similar, but 
as described in the text there are grounds for doubting the comparability across countries of these measures of between-group 
inequality contribution.  
  24
can be attributed to between group differences.
27  In Figure 7, we can see that in all cases 
considered here there is great sensitivity of overall inequality to between-group 
differences and this is strongly significant for all group decompositions. 
These correlations are suggestive but, of course, far from conclusive.   
Nevertheless they are consistent with an argument that has been articulated most recently 
in the World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report, namely that overall inequality in 
the developing world tends to be high and to persist over long periods of time in those 
countries in which inequalities of opportunity across population groups are accentuated.
28  
The Report argues that the level and persistence of such inequalities of opportunity act as 
a brake on economic growth and dampen prospects for rapid poverty reduction.  For this 
reason policy makers have an important instrumental reason for concentrating on 
reducing group differences alongside the more conventionally acknowledged intrinsic 
objections to inequality. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, we propose a modification to the conventional approach of 
decomposing income inequality by population sub-groups.  We note that the conventional 
practice of calculating the share of between-group inequality is equivalent to comparing 
observed between-group inequality (across a few groups) against a benchmark (across 
perhaps millions of groups) that is quite extreme.  Specifically, we propose a measure 
that evaluates observed between-group inequality against a benchmark of maximum 
                                                 
27 Indeed, if there were concerns about noise in the data, high inequality countries would likely be countries in which there 
was more noise.  Pure noise would result in smaller between-group shares (because of greater overlap across groups).  As a 
result, if anything one might expect a negative relationship. 
28 As mentioned earlier in this section, only differences between ‘social groups’ in these countries can strictly be interpreted as 
inequality of opportunity in the Roemer sense.  The income/consumption differences between other groups, such as rural-
urban, education, and occupation are likely due, at least in part, to choices people have made.  
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between-group inequality that can be attained when the number and relative sizes of 
groups under examination are fixed.  As our measure normalizes between group 
inequality by the number and relative size of groups under examination, it is also less 
subject to problems of comparability across different settings.  We argue that our 
modification can provide a complementary perspective on the question of whether a 
particular population breakdown is salient to an assessment of inequality in a country. 
It is important to note that our measure is not the result of a statistical 
decomposition of any inequality measure of a certain class.  Rb'  is concerned with 
evaluating between-group inequality against a proper benchmark and as such places less 
emphasis on inequality within groups.  It is our contention that if one is interested in 
assessing inequality of opportunity between certain groups, using the traditional 
contribution of between-group inequality to overall inequality may unduly color that 
assessment. 
Our measure is simple to calculate, particularly when we preserve the “pecking 
order” of the groups under examination.  We find that for a large set of countries our 
assessment of the importance of group differences typically increases substantially on the 
basis of this alternative approach.  The ranking of countries (or different population 
groups) can also differ from that obtained using traditional decomposition methods.   
Finally, we observe an interesting pattern of higher levels of overall inequality in 
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Appendix:  Maximum Between Group Inequality:  Analysis and Programming 
In this appendix we will be mainly concerned with the Gini coefficient for measuring 
inequality. For reasons of exposition we will assume that the income distribution is 
absolutely continuous with density f(y), CDF F(y) and Lorenz curve L(p). We define 
between-group inequality as the total inequality one would obtain if all incomes within 
groups were equal. As mentioned in Foster and Shneyerov (2000), between-group 
inequality can be defined in several ways that lead to different outcomes for a between-
group Gini if groups have overlapping income ranges. However, the same ambiguity does 
not exist for maximum between-group inequality, since the maximum implies non-
overlapping income ranges.   
Figure A.1 depicts the Lorenz curve: L(p), p∈[0,1], as well as a Lorenz curve based 
on the same distribution, but for groups j=1,…,n, with non-overlapping incomes, and 
equal incomes within groups: Lg(p) . The share of each group in the population is wj. 
The following are easily verified:  
1. If the groups have non-overlapping income they can be mapped along the 
horizontal axis of the graph according to increasing per capita income, as adjacent 
intervals of width wj.  
2.  ) ( ) ( p L p L g =  at boundery points p of the intervals.  
3.  Lg is a piecewise-linear approximation to L. The approximation is better, the 
smaller are the population shares wj.  
4.  ) ( ) ( p L p L g ≤ . Hence the Gini (and all Lorenz-consistent inequality indices) of Lg 
is smaller than that of L.   
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The between-group Gini for groups with non-overlapping income ranges is 
unambiguously given by the Gini coefficient corresponding to Lg(p) .  Since non-
overlapping income ranges are a necessary condition for achieving maximum between-
group inequality we have proved  
Theorem 
Under the conditions of this section, maximizing the between-group Gini is equivalent to 
ordering the groups j=1…,n along the horizontal axis in such a way that the area under 
the resulting Lorenz curve Lg is minimal. 
In principle, one can solve the max-BGI problem by trying out all n! group orders and 
calculate the BGI index (Gini or other) for the resulting piecewise-linear Lorenz curves. 
Obviously, this is not a viable strategy if the number of groups is big.
29  
The max-BGI problem can be formalized as an integer programming problem as 
follows. Define integer variables aij to equal 1 if group i has strictly lower expenditure 
than group j, and zero otherwise. (So group i comes before j in the income distribution.) 
The aij must satisfy the following conditions:  
  aij∈{0,1}  
  aii=0 
  i≠j⇒aij+aji=1 
  ∀i,j,k:aik≥aij+ajk-1  
                                                 
29One may verify that if the Lorenz curve is quadratic, the between-group Gini does not 
depend on the order of groups. Further, it should be clear that one cannot exclude a 
particular group order a priori. Take any group order and give equal incomes to members 
from the same group (and incomes increasing with group rank). Then that particular order 
maximizes BGI for the resulting income distribution.   
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The last condition is in fact a ‘linear version’ of the transitivity condition 
jk ij ik a a a k j i ≥ ∀ : , ,  which states that if i is poorer than j and j is poorer than k, then i is 
poorer than k. The location of group j’s interval on the horizontal axis can now be 
expressed as (lj,uj], where  
  lj= ∑
i
 wiaij 
  uj=lj+wj, 
while group j’s income share is  L(uj)-L(lj) . Obviously,  1 + = j j u l . Geometrically, 
from the total size of all groups poorer than j, i.e. lj, and group j’s size wj, the location of 
the group’s chord on the Lorenz curve L(p) can be determined. See again Figure A.1. 
Group j’s contribution Sj to the area under the linearized Lorenz curve is  
 
2








and so the programming problem becomes  
 min  ∑
j=1
N
 wj (L(lj)+L(uj)) with respect to  , ij a  
subject to  
  aij∈{0,1}  
  aii=0 
  i≠j⇒aij+aji=1 
  aik≥aij+ajk-1 
  lj= ∑
i
 wiaij 
  uj=lj+wj, 
 
where i,j,k=1,…,N.  
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For other inequality measures the max-BGI problem can be formulated using the 
same constraints but a different objective function. Many inequality measures (such as all 
those in the GE class and the Atkinson inequality measures) are defined as functions of 
the groups’ relative mean incomes μj/μ, where μ denotes overall average income and μj 
average income in group j. Such inequality measures can be expressed in terms of the 
above notation by noting that with non-overlapping income ranges 
  μj/μ = (L(uj)-L(lj))/wj. 
Although all the constraints in the program are linear, the objective function is not, 
and the problem turns out to be a highly ‘non-convex’ integer program. Easily available 
solvers for this type of problem do not work.
30  Fortunately, some further analytical 
results can be obtained for the Gini.   Moreover, as mentioned in the text, a maximum 
BGI that preserves the income ranking of groups represents a practical, if not entirely 
exact, alternative approach. 
 
The Gini coefficient of BGI: further analysis and computation 
In this sub-section we present some further analytical results on the problem of 
calculating maximum BGI. These results are for the Gini coefficient and as such of 
limited value for the analysis of between-group inequality. On the other hand, a between-
group Gini maximizing group order is very likely to have a close-to-maximum between-
group inequality index for other measures as well.   
                                                 
30We tried the GAMS solvers DICOPT and SBB.  
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We use the following extension to Jensen’s inequality.  
Lemma 
Let g(x) be a (not necessarily strictly) convex function on a convex set X. Then for t>0 
and (x-t,x+t)⊂X:  
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x g du u x g
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Obvious. The theorem essentially states that the effect of a mean-preserving spread gets 
stronger as probability mass is shifted outward, the mean being equal to x here. Further 
below we apply the lemma with the first derivative of the Lorenz curve (i.e. F
-1(p))  i n  
the role of g(x).  
Corollary 
Let G the an anti-derivative of g defined by  ds s g t x G
t x
x ) ( ) ( ∫
+
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This can be seen by taking the derivative of the above expression and noting that for t > 0 
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from which H'(t)≥0 follows by applying the lemma. The corollary can be used to proof 
the following  
Theorem 
Let groups A and B be adjacent in a group order that maximizes the between-group Gini 
coefficient, with A having the lower incomes. Let  ) (
1 p F
−  be convex on the interval 
   (l A,uB]. Then  B A w w ≥ .  
Remark 
Since F(y) is nondecreasing, it is concave where  ) (
1 p F
−  is convex and vice versa. This 
corresponds to an income distribution which has monotonically decreasing density.
31  
According to the theorem a BGI (Gini) maximizing group order must have decreasing 
group sizes if the density is decreasing over the relevant income range.  
Proof 
Let μ be average income, then the Lorenz curve satisfies  
  . ) ( ) (
0
1 ds s F p L
p
∫
− = μ  
Recall that the contribution of groups A and B to the between-group Gini is minus the 
surface S
AB under the chords connecting the points  )) ( , ( A A L l l ,  )) ( , ( )) ( , ( B B A A L u L u l l =  
and  )) ( , ( B B u L u . If the group order A,B is part of a Gini-maximizing order, the surface 
under the chords must not be higher than with groups A and B in reverse order.  
                                                 
31Convex functions are differentiable almost everywhere.  
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Let A and B be located between percentages  A s l =  and  B B A u w w s = + + . If A is before 
B the contribution of the two groups is  
  )). ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( 2 B A A B A A AB w w s L w s L w w s L s L w S + + + + + + + =  
Alternatively, if B is before A the contribution is  
  )). ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( 2 B A B A B B BA w w s L w s L w w s L s L w S + + + + + + + =  
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Note that the same method of proof can be used mutatis mutandis to show that groups 
must be in increasing size order if the income distribution has increasing density. Thus 
we have the following corollary.   
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Corollary 
 If the income distribution is unimodal, then a between-group Gini maximizing group 
order has groups arranged in increasing size where the density is increasing and in 
decreasing size where the density is decreasing.
32   
 
This last result is useful for practical computation. It implies that for the common case of 
a unimodal distribution the largest group is located near the mode of the distribution with 
increasing group sizes for incomes lower than the mode, and decreasing group sizes for 
higher incomes. When the fraction of the population with incomes below the mode is of 
the same order of magnitude of (or smaller than) group sizes, only n or n2 of the n! group 
orders will have to be checked to find the order maximizing BGI. Note further that if a 
particular group order maximizes the between-group Gini, it is likely also to lead to 
values for other inequality measures, close to the maximum. 
Bounds on the maximum between-group Gini 
The difference between the maximum between-group Gini and the overall Gini originates 
from the fact that Lg is an imperfect approximation to L. As mentioned above, the 
difference is smaller the smaller are the group sizes. In fact, the difference can be crudely 
bounded by maximum group size wM=maxc({wc}) . First note that uj=lj+1 and define 
ln+1=un=1. Then the difference in Ginis is  
                                                 
32See also Davies and Shorrocks (1989) and Shorrocks and Wan (2004).  
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The difference is bounded by a weighted average of group sizes, the weights being 
Lorenz-curve increments. If the maximum group size is less than 10% of the population, 
the BGI for an arbitrary group order is at most 10% (points) below the overall Gini and 
the difference will be even smaller for the BGI maximizing group order. With group sizes 
smaller than 10% the gain of using maximum BGI as a benchmark instead of total 
inequality is therefore limited. 
 
To derive a lower bound for the difference, note that the between-group Gini does not 
decrease (and will typically increase) if groups are refined into smaller groups. It follows 
that for 














⎛ − + + ∫
+w s
s s dp p L w s L s L w ) ( 2 )) ( ) ( ( min  
(















)) ( ) ( ( min
w s L w s L w w s L s L w















w s L s L





M w w =  and  )] 2 / ( 2 / )) ( ) ( [( min ) ( w s L w s L s L w a s + − + + = , it follows
33 that 











⎛ − ∫ ∫    
 
Figure A.1: Lorenz curve L(p) and piecewise linear approximation Lg(p). There are 




                                                 





















India 3  0.136  5.1  10.1 
Bangladesh 4  0.181  20.3  28.7 
Kazakhstan 3  0.217  9.0  14.7 
Nepal   10  0.220  23.3  23.7 
United States  5  0.295  8.4  14.7 
Panama 10  0.423  16.7  36.4 
Brazil 4  0.442  16.2  20.0 
South Africa  3  0.563  38.0  55.0 
Note: data for India refer to rural areas only.  
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Figure 4: Between-group inequality decompositions: urban-rural 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from household survey data. 
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Figure 5: Between-group inequality decompositions: social group of the household 
head
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Figure 6: Between-group inequality decompositions: education of the household head 
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Figure 7: 
Regressions of total inequality on shares of between-group inequality of different 
household characteristics 
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